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ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a
single reserve price for partially identiﬁed auction models, such as [Haile
and Tamer, 2003], using data on transaction prices from English auctions.
The paper employs [Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989] for inference that is ro-
bust with respect to the prior over unidentiﬁed parameters. It is optimal to
interpret the transaction price as the highest value, and maximize the pos-
terior mean of the seller’s revenue. The Monte Carlo study shows substan-
tial gains relative to the average revenues of the Haile and Tamer interval.
Keywords: optimal reserve price, statistical decision theory, partial identi-
ﬁcation, maxmin expected utility.
JEL classiﬁcation: C11, C44, D44, E61
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the problem of choosing a reserve price using a sam-
ple of transaction prices from English auctions with independent private
values (IPV). Under a weak behavioral assumption that the winner always
obtains a nonnegative surplus as in [Haile and Tamer, 2003] (HT), the pa-
per proposes a decision rule that selects a single reserve price following the
framework of [Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989] (GS).
[Paarsch, 1997] employs the button auction model, which regards ob-
served bids as latent values, to point identify the valuation distribution and
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then chooses a revenue maximizing reserve price (RMRP) implied by the es-
timated valuation distribution.
1 Many English auctions, however, impose a
minimum bid increment, and often bidders raise the price by more than the
minimum bid increment (jump bidding), thereby invalidating this identify-
ing assumption.
2 As a result, using this assumption may lead to a severely
incorrect inference; see HT.
HTemploysanincompletemodelinstead, onlyassumingthatthebidders
neither overbid their values nor let the auction terminate at a price they can
proﬁtably overbid. For this partially identiﬁed model, HT proposes a set
estimator for the RMRP (the HT interval). This approach is robust to any
misspeciﬁcation of bidding behavior. But, the HT interval does not provide
a practical guidance for the seller to choose a single reserve price because
a signiﬁcant fraction of the interval can be less proﬁtable than zero reserve
price (34–52% ; Table 1).
Tosolvetheseller’sproblem, thispaper, whileusingtheincompletemodel,
choosesasinglereservepriceemployingthemaxminexpectedutilityframe-
work of GS, thereby complementing HT. GS extends the classic expected
utility theory to allow the decision maker to have many equally reasonable
distributions over the random vector that affects the payoff. GS shows that
if he is uncertainty averse, he behaves as if he maximizes the lower envelop
of the equally reasonable expected utilities.
3 Maxmin criteria provides a ro-
bust framework to select an optimal policy for partially identiﬁed models;
see [Song, 2010; Kitagawa, 2010, 2011; Menzel, 2011] for recent applications.
To formulate the seller’s problem within this framework, the paper con-
siders the parameter vector that indexes the valuation distribution as the
random vector that affects the revenue. The paper then divides the param-
eters into two groups: identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed. The former indexes the
density of the transaction price and the latter captures any discrepancy be-
tween the densities of the transaction price and the highest values.
4 The
1 Following the convention in the literature, the term ‘revenue’ refers to the seller’s
expected revenue where the expectation taken with respect to the values density.
2 There does not exist an equilibrium with jump bidding under assumptions reasonable
in many auction settings [Lellouche and Romm, 2009].
3Uncertainty aversion means a decision maker prefers known risks to unknown risks.
4Within the setting of [Paarsch, 1997], there would be no need for the second group as
the two densities would be the same.A POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 3
seller is assumed to have a unique prior distribution over the identiﬁed pa-
rameters, but many reasonable priors over the unidentiﬁed ones, where a
prior is said to be ‘reasonable’ if it does not contradict the only behavioral
assumption – the transaction price does not exceed the highest value. Al-
though each of these priors conveys different information about bidding
behavior, if the seller regards them as equally reasonable, then he should
maximize the lower envelop of posterior expectations of revenues.
This paper shows that the lower envelop is achieved by the prior equat-
ing the densities of the transaction price and the highest value. This follows
from observing that the transaction price distribution is ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominated by every highest valuation distribution that is supported
by at least one of the reasonable priors. The former then gives the greatest
lower bound for the stochastic dominance relation of the marginal distribu-
tions of independent value, providing the smallest revenue at every reserve
price. Therefore, the method interprets the transaction price as the highest
value and implements the classic expected utility framework. Furthermore,
the method remains optimal for correlated values under the assumption of
[Aradillas-L´ opez, Gandhi, and Quint, 2011] that the sample of transaction
price identiﬁes the distribution of the second highest values.
The next section describes the seller’s problem and section 3 develops
an optimal decision rule. Section 4 illustrates typical revenue gains over
average revenues of the HT interval via Monte Carlo experiments. Section
5 concludes and an appendix collects all computational details.
2. AUCTION MODELS
A single indivisible object is auctioned among m  2 risk neutral bid-
ders in an English auction. Each bidder i observes only his values vi  0.
Assume v1,...,vm are drawn independently from an identical, absolutely
continuous distribution Pv with density pv.5 The auction starts at zero price
and at each time bidders raise the standing price ˜ y by at least D, the mini-
mum bid increment. Bidding more than ˜ y + D is known as jump bidding.
5Throughout the paper, the upper (lower) case letter denotes the cdf (pdf).4 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
When no bidder is willing to raise ˜ y further, the auction allocates the ob-
ject to the bidder who offers the ﬁnal bid at the transaction price y := ˜ y.
Following HT, this paper makes the assumption:
Assumption 1. (A-HT) The transaction price y  x := maxfv1,...,vmg.
This assumption is weaker than the assumptions in HT, which also requires
that the bidders do not let their opponents win at a price they can over-
bid. The data zT available to the seller consists of i.i.d transaction prices
(y1,...,yT) from past T auctions, each with m bidders.
Now, consider a seller with data zT who wishes to choose a reserve price
to maximize his revenue in a future auction. The future auction can take
any of the ‘standard’ auctions where a bidder with zero value expects to
pay zero.6 The valuation distribution remains unchanged and the seller’s
values for the object is zero. [Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981]





v (x)   rPm
v (r), (1)





Since the seller does not know Pv, he cannot use (2) to determine r. For this
problem, [Paarsch, 1997] proposes to estimate Pv by treating the observed
bids as losers values in the button auction model, and use the point esti-
mates in (2) instead of Pv (a.k.a. ‘plug-in’ method).7 When D > 0 or there
is jump bidding, however, the assumption that bids equal values can be un-
reasonable. HT shows that this assumption can cause a signiﬁcant bias in
the estimation of Pv even for a correctly speciﬁed parametric model.
For this reason, HT only assumes that bidders do not overbid their value
and do not let the auction terminate at a price that they can proﬁtably over-
bid. Then, HT partially identiﬁes Pv and constructs a set estimator for the
6 A standard auction is an auction where the highest bidder gets the object.
7When only transaction prices are observed, the button auction model identiﬁes the
distribution of the second highest value, which is sufﬁcient for identifying the valuation
distribution when values are i.i.d.A POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 5
RMRP. These set estimates are robust to any misspeciﬁcation on bidding
behavior with jump bidding and D > 0.
The HT interval itself, however, does not completely solve the seller’s
problem. Moreover, the HT interval includes many reserve prices with rev-
enue lower than with zero reserve price. Table 1 shows that such reserve
prices are about 34% to 52% of the HT intervals, each of which is obtained
from bid samples of 200 auctions generated from a ﬁxed data generating
processes (DGP), i.e., a combination of a valuation distribution in Figures 1
and 2 and m 2 f3,5g bidders.8 In most cases, zero reserve price produces
substantially higher revenues than average revenues of the HT intervals,
see Table 2. This stems from the asymmetric shape of the revenue function.
The revenue gradually increases up to the RMRP, marked in the ﬁgures, but
it drops sharply thereafter, while the upper limit of the HT interval is much
higher than the RMRP.
What should then be the criteria to choose a single reserve price? The next
section proposes a solution.
3. G MAXMIN SOLUTION
This section develops an optimal point decision rule for the seller. The
optimality is associated with the seller’s preference ordering. The paper
assumes that
Assumption 2. (A-GS) The seller satisﬁes the axioms (A.1–A.6) in GS.
(A-GS) coincides with assumptions in the classic expected utility theory, ex-
cept it allows the seller to weakly prefers any convex combination of indif-
ferent lotteries to each individual one instead of restricting the combination
to be indifferent– uncertainty aversion.9
This section develops the decision rule for auctions with the IPV and fur-
ther argues that the rule remains optimal even when values are correlated if
the distribution of the second highest value is identiﬁed.
8 Section 4 explains each DGP’s in detail.
9 One interpretation of this is that the decision maker prefers to secure himself against a
potential loss from a particular risky asset by spreading the risk over the indifferent assets
(as in a portfolio management).6 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
3.1. Independent Private Values: Let q 2 Q index the distribution of the
transaction price y, and h 2 H capture any discrepancy between the distri-
butions of x and y. Since Px(xjq,h) = Pm




to make them comparable.
The seller has only three sources of information: the data zT, (A-HT) and
his subjective beliefs about q represented by the prior pq over Q. Consider,
however, a hypothetical situation in which he also has a conditional prior
ph(jq) over H for each q 2 Q. In such a situation, [Kim, 2012] posits choos-
ing a reserve price as the seller’s decision problem under parameter uncer-
tainty.10 The paper shows that if the seller behaves rationally in the sense
of [Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963], he would maximize the

















[Kim, 2012] discusses the optimality of this Bayesian approach from the fre-
quentistperspective, andshowsthatitcanproducesubstantiallyhigherrev-
enues than the plug-in rule.
When h is not identiﬁed, however, this approach can be sensitive to the
choice of the conditional prior ph(jq)– since (5) can be written as











10 The plug-in approach does not consider the parameter uncertainty because it regards
the point estimate of the valuation distribution as the true distribution. Then, under this
hypothesis, the plug-in approach ‘certainly’ maximizes the seller’s revenue.A POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 7
the impact of ph(jq) on the solution to maximize (4) does not disappear
even when T is large. Prior to HT, the literature had employed the but-
ton auction model, which can be viewed as a strong prior that equates the
distributions of x and y. As HT shows, such an assumption can lead to a
misleading inference, when there is jump bidding or D > 0. Even though
an econometrician can employ a less informative prior in a hope of using
weaker assumptions, it would still bear some information about unveriﬁ-
able bidding behavior.
This paper instead considers a convex set G of reasonable conditional pri-
ors on h given q and assumes that the seller regards all the elements in G as
equally reasonable. A conditional prior ph(jq) is said to be reasonable if it
conforms to (A-HT) for every q 2 Q. Formally, G is a set of all ph(j) such
that, for all (q,h) 2 Q  H
pq(q)ph(hjq) > 0 , Px(wjq,h)  Py(wjq). (6)






That is, a seller should choose a reserve price that maximizes the revenue in
(4) with respect to the most pessimistic prior in G.
Deﬁnition 1. A decision rule that solves (7) for every realization of zT is called the
G maxmin rule.
This framework is particularly useful for the partially identiﬁed auction
model because its policy recommendation is robust to the choice of priors
over the unidentiﬁed parameter h. Solving (7) is, however, computation-
ally expensive because the ‘min’ part solves an optimization problem over
a space of high dimensional functions for every r considered for the maxi-
mization problem. 11
The central result of this paper is that this issue does not arise for the
seller’s problem. The following proposition establishes that a probability
11 [Chamberlain, 2000] proposes a computation algorithm for a similar problem, but
with a simple utility function.8 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
mass function degenerated at h = 0, denoted by d0, solves the minimization
problem.





E[u(q,h,r)jzT; ph] = max
r2A
E[u(q,h,r)jzT;d0] (8)
Proof. Consider any (q,h) 2 QH for which there is some ph 2 G such that
pq(q)ph(hjq) > 0. Then, (6) implies Px(wjq,h)  Py(wjq) , Pm
v (wjq,h) 
Pm
v (wjq,0) for all w 2 <+ and m  2. Thus, rPm
v (rjq,h)  rPm
v (rjq,0), for
any r 2 A  <+. Moreover, since Pm 1
v (xjq,h)  Pm 1









These inequalities then imply u(q,h,r)  u(q,0,r) (see (1)) and hence
E[u(q,h,r)jzT, ph]  E[u(q,0,r)jzT, ph] = E[u(q,h,r)jzT,d0].
Finally, d0 2 G because it implies x  y with equality. 
This result implies that choosing the worst prior amounts to treating the
transaction price as the highest values.
3.2. CorrelatedPrivateValues: [Aradillas-L´ opez, Gandhi, andQuint,2011]
considers a more general auction model with correlated value for the same
type of data set as in this paper but under a stronger assumption that
Assumption 3. (A-AGQ) The transaction price is equal to the second highest
values.
Let the bidders private values (v1,...,vm) be distributed as Pv(,...,jq,h).
Now, the distributions of the highest and second-highest values are not nec-
essarily linked through the identical marginal valuation distribution, in par-
ticular Px 6= Pm




maxfr,xgdPy(xjq)   rPx(rjq,h), (9)
which is more general than (1). Under (A-AGQ), zT point identiﬁes Py(jq),
but not Px(jq,h). Hence, (9) can only be partially identiﬁed; see [Aradillas-
L´ opez, Gandhi, and Quint, 2011]. In particular, it is bounded below byA POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 9
u(q,0,r). Now, consider the G with property (6). Then, it is straightfor-
ward to show that the seller would also solve (8) with the revenue (9) as
formalized below.
Proposition 2. When the value are correlated, under (A-GS) and (A-AGQ), (8)
holds true for the revenue deﬁned in (9).
4. COMPARISONS BETWEEN G-MAXMIN & HAILE AND TAMER
This section compares performances of the G-maxmin rule with the av-
erage revenues associated with the HT interval for four valuation densities
in Figures 1 and 2, which also show the associated revenue functions for
for bidders m = 3,4,5. Figure 1 is associated with the density similar to
an exponential distribution as well as the long-tailed density.12 Similarly,
Figure 2 is associated with lognormal densities with alternative parame-
ters.
13 Then, for each of these valuation densities, the experiments consider
T 2 f100,200g sample sizes and m 2 f3,5g bidders, leading to a total of
16 experiments. Each experiment, i.e., each triplet of (values density, T, m),
conducts 1,000 Monte Carlo replications.
For each experiment, the seller selects a bidder randomly and uses D˜ y :=
0.05  ˜ y as the minimum bid increment rule. The chosen bidder bids ex-
actly ˜ y + D˜ y, as long as it is less than his value. Each replication uses only
transaction prices to implement the G maxmin approach, but uses all bids to
implement the HT approach for a comparison with the tightest HT interval.
Then the corresponding revenues are computed, where the revenue under
HT is deﬁned to be the average revenue across the interval. Note that HT
does not propose any particular method to choose the reserve price from
the interval.
12 These densities have the form of (10) with k = 15. For the exponential-like den-
sity, the parameter values are q :=(0.3548, 0.2350, 0.1486, 0.0946, 0.0466, 0.0440, 0.0217,
0.0119, 0.0089, 0.0080, 0.0084, 0.0081, 0.0049, 0.0028, 0.0017) and for the long-tailed den-
sity, q :=(0.0748, 0.1403, 0.1871, 0.5145, 0.0009, 0.0009, 0.0009, 0.0009, 0.0009, 0.0009, 0.0009,
0.0750, 0.0009, 0.0009, 0.0002).
13 The lognormal distributions with (m,s) = (3,1) and (4,1/2) are truncated at the 99-
th percentile and rescaled so that their supports are the unit interval. HT employs the
lognormal densities that appear in Figure 2 for Monte Carlo studies.10 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
The section reports the average percentage gain of the G-maxmin rule
over the HT interval. The experiments specify the distribution of the trans-






qjBeta(yjj,k   j + 1)
#m
, (10)
where q 2 Dk 1, the k   1 dimensional unit simplex, i.e., qj  0 for all
j = 1,...,k   1 and å
k 1
j=1 qj  1, and Beta(ja,b) denotes the beta cdf with
parameters a and b; see [Petrone, 1999a,b] for a nonparametric Bayesian
method that uses (10). This paper employs the model with k = 15 with the
uniform prior over D14.
Table 3 summarizes the main results. Each column stands for the val-
uation densities and each row for the number of bidders m with different
sample sizes T, so that each cell of the table shows the percentage revenue
gain. For example, the ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst column is associated with
(Pv,T,m) = (Exponential-like,100,3) and that the revenue gain of the G-
maxmin approach over the HT interval is around 20.16%. With ﬁve bidders,
this gain is around 3.71% (second row). The third and fourth rows collects
the results when T = 200.
Figure 3 explains these revenue gains. Each panel depicts the distribu-
tions of the reserve prices chosen by G minimax approach (heavy solid) and
the lower and upper bounds for the HT interval (light solid) along with the
revenue function. Upper (lower) panels are with T = 100 (T = 200), and the
left (the right) are with m = 3 (m = 5). The left-upper panel shows that the
upper bound of the HT interval is distributed around 0.5, while the revenue
function indicates that all the reserve prices larger than approximately 0.3
produces lower revenues than zero reserve price. This implies that a signif-
icant portion (33.95%; Table 1) of the HT interval is less proﬁtable than zero
reserve price. On the other hand, the G maxmin rule is distributed over the
area in which the revenue is increasing, selecting higher reserve prices than
the lower bound of the HT interval. As a result, the G maxmin rule produces
larger revenues than the average revenue of the HT interval.
This pattern is commonly observed from all the experiments; see Figures
3 - 6. The rest of the table shows signiﬁcant revenue gains of the G maxminA POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 11
rule, suggesting that G maxmin approach can provide a practical policy rec-
ommendation.
5. CONCLUSION
The literature, since [Paarsch, 1997], has proposed various procedures
to determine a reserve price for the revenue maximizing seller of an auc-
tion. In particular, for the English auction, the exact procedure depends on
the type of data (all bids vs only transaction prices) and on the behavioral
assumptions (button auction model vs. incomplete models). All of these
procedures except Kim [2012], however, view the seller’s decision problem
as essentially an estimation problem: estimate the valuation distribution,
use these estimates to obtain the RMRP, and study asymptotic properties of
the estimates (either a point or a set). Extending the formal Bayesian deci-
sion method of Kim [2012], and using GS this paper proposes a solution to
choose a single reserve price for an English auction with partially identiﬁed
valuation distribution. This paper shows that it is optimal to employ the
Bayesian method interpreting the transaction prices as the highest values.
APPENDIX A. COMPUTATION
Each Monte Carlo experiment obtains a sample q1,...,qS from posterior
distribution using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. For this initial step,
a ﬂat prior over Dk 1 and a sample z1
T is employed for constructing the pos-
terior. Each replication conducts all the inference applying the importance
sampling method to (q1,...,qS), the prior for the experiment, and a new
sample zl
n from the given DGP. This section illustrates computational de-
tails.
A.1. Sampling from the Posterior with a ﬂat prior. For each pair of (Pv,m)
andfortheﬁrstMonteCarloreplication, TheMetropolisHastingsalgorithm
draws random parameters from the posterior with the sample z1
T and the
prior given by p(q) = Õ
k
j=1 pj(qj) with pj(q) µ 1 for j = 1,...,k. Let qs
denote the s-th sample from the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
For the experiments with the exponential-like and the long-tailed densi-
ties, The true parameter value is used as the initial value for the algorithm,
and for the log-normal like densities, a vector of 1/k is used for the initial12 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
value. Then, at the s-th Metropolis Hastings step, the algorithm updates qs





Then, the algorithm draws a candidtate ˜ qj  qj(jqj,s), the proposal density






























j , otherwise. For each k, we iterate the algorithm 200,000 times
recording every 200-th iteration. Among these 2,000 draws, we employ the
last 1,000 for the implementation of the decision rules (S = 1,000).
A.2. Proposal density. For the proposal density qj, we employ a Gaussian
density with mean qs 1
j and variance s2
j that is truncated so that ˜ qj,s belongs












and also let F(qs
j) := F

































The inverse CDF method draws ˜ qj from (12). Moreover, since pj() µ 1 for

























for s > 20 with s := min(s,0.4  S). This adaptive method is similar to
Haario, Saksman, and Tamminen [2005].
A.3. Replication 2 to 1,000: Importance Sampling. This paper approxi-



























where q1,...,qS  p(qjzT
n) µ lT(z1
Tjq).
A.4. Revenue Approximation. The seller’s revenue in (1) can be written as





The trapezoid rule approximates all the integrals of (15) using the J = 1,001
equidistant reference points on the unit interval, x0,x1,...,x1001 with xj =




j=0 , the set of all feasible reserve price. With a slight
abuse of notation, f and F denotes J dimensional vector of the pdf and cdf of
the values density evaluated at each xj 2 A, respectively. For this purpose,
many statistical softwares (e.g., Matlab) evaluate the pdf and the cdf for the
beta distribution and the (log)normal distribution. Let ˜ A := (˜ a1,..., ˜ aJ)0
with ˜ aj := 0 if j = 1, and otherwise
˜ aj := ˜ aj 1 +
Fj   Fj 1
2(xj   xj 1)

















foranydimensionconformablevectorsC = (c1,...,cJ)0 and D = (d1 ...,dJ)0.
Then, the j-the element of
u := (m  iJ) 

x  (1  F)  F(m 1) + A

(17)14 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
approximates the revenue (15) at each xj 2 A under the values density f.
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TABLE 1. Proportion (%) of r in HT with u(0,) > u(r,)
Bidders Exponential Longtail LogNormal LogNormal
m -like density density (3,1) (4,1/2)
3 33.9450 41.0042 44.2857 46.3710
5 50.5227 46.7213 51.7094 45.8763
TABLE 2. Percentage Gain in Revenue r = 0
Bidders Exponential Longtail LogNormal LogNormal
m -like density density (3,1) (4,1/2)
3 -0.8729 2.4371 2.2681 2.0731
5 3.4608 1.9613 2.5633 0.3006
TABLE 3. Percentage Revenue Gain of the G maxmin rule
Bidders Exponential Longtail LogNormal LogNormal
m -like density density (3,1) (4,1/2)
T = 100
3 20.1632 2.5702 8.4945 2.5867
5 3.7097 0.8163 3.7629 0.2331
T = 200
3 5.9121 5.0051 7.3387 2.5821
5 5.0957 2.1929 3.8419 0.3489A POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 17
FIGURE 1. Valuation Densities and Revenue Functions





































































































Panels (a) and (c) plot the exponential like density function and associated
revenue functions for alternative number of bidders m. Panels (b) and
(d) similarly for the longtail values density. On panels (c) and (d), rR(f0)
indicates the revenue maximizing reserve price.18 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
FIGURE 2. Valuation Densities and Revenue Functions

















(a) LogNormal with (µ,σ)=(3,1)















































(b) LogNormal with (µ,σ)=(4,1/2)
































Panels (a) and (c) plot the lognormal density with (m,s) = (3,1) and as-
sociated revenue functions for alternative number of bidders m. Panels
(b) and (d) similarly for (m,s) = (4,1/2). On panels (c) and (d), rR(f0)
indicates the revenue maximizing reserve price.A POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 19
FIGURE 3. Exponential-like Distribution














← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,3)
















← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,5)














← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,3)
















← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,5)
The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower
and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices
chosen by the G-minmax (heavy).20 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
FIGURE 4. Longtail Distribution















← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,3)

















← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,5)















← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,3)

















← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,5)
The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower
and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices
chosen by the G-minmax (heavy).A POINT DECISION FOR PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AUCTION MODELS 21
FIGURE 5. Lognormal (3,1)













← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,3)














← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,5)













← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,3)














← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,5)
The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower
and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices
chosen by the G-minmax (heavy).22 G. ARYAL AND D. KIM
FIGURE 6. Lognormal (4,1/2)














← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,3)















← → HT set
(T,m) = (200,5)














← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,3)















← → HT set
(T,m) = (100,5)
The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower
and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices
chosen by the G-minmax (heavy).